Most state laws that require regular safety inspections for passenger vehicles were passed more than 75 years ago, at a time when motor vehicle fatalities per mile traveled were about 8 times higher than in the 21st century and vehicles lacked many of the safety features we benefit from today. A growing number of states […]
Daily Caller: Corporate Welfare Is Alive And Well Among Car Dealerships
Every state has laws on the books that increase vehicle costs, essentially transferring income from the buying public to car dealers. The problem is so widespread that American consumers collectively pay $47.5 billion more per year than they would in the absence of these regulations, according to a recent study by the American Consumer Institute. […]
Corporate Welfare: How Automobile Dealership Franchise Regulations Cost Consumers an Additional $48 Billion Annually
This ConsumerGram explores the consequences of various state laws written to advantage automobile dealer franchises. Because many of these laws work to increase vehicle costs and set geographic restrictions that limit price competition, they serve to transfer income from the buying public to dealerships. Specifically, this ConsumerGram finds that American consumers collectively pay $47.5 billion […]
When You Want Real Progress, Set a Realistic Goal
The miles per gallon (mpg) efficiency for an automobile makers’ cars is gauged against the EPA’s efficiency standards. Different standards apply to each model of car and truck because the vehicle size (wheelbase multiplied by track) establishes the EPA efficiency target, and the standards increase over time at a torrid pace. The Corporate Average Fuel […]
Regulators Seem Inclined To Mess With Insurance Rates
The never-ending friction between common sense and political meddling has metastasized into needless automobile insurance regulation. The New York State Department of Financial Services has started probing the legitimacy of considering occupation as a factor in setting automobile insurance rates. In order to get the right prices, i.e. prices that reflect anticipated claims cost, insurance […]
ACI on ABC: NC’s Hidden Car Fees
This video segment, produced and aired by the ABC affiliate in Asheville, discusses a hidden fee on good driver premiums used to subsidize more risky drivers. This is another example of out-of-control regulations that hurt consumers.
ACI in Charlotte Observer: NC Auto Insurance System is Price Fixing
There has been some disagreement on how North Carolina’s auto insurance regulations affect consumers. Those favoring the current system say that it keeps auto insurance rates low, while opponents say that it is an arcane regulatory system that stifles competition and requires good drivers to pay a hidden tax so that riskier drivers can pay […]
Economic Journal Article by Fuhr and Pociask: Auto Insurance Price Regs Hurt Consumers
An article was published in the Indian Economic Journal that demonstrates the economic harm of price regulation of the auto insurance market. The article shows that auto insurance rates and rate instability are higher in more regulated markets. In addition, there is no evidence that the market has insufficient rivals to achieve competitive prices, that industry profits are […]
New Pinnacle Report Confirms the Obvious – Lower Fraud Costs Could Lead to Lower Florida Auto Insurance Prices in 2013, Maybe
As required by law, a new study was provided to the Florida’s Office of Insurance Regulation on the feasibility of lower automobile insurance prices. The study by Pinnacle Actuaries found that lower prices should eventually materialize as a result of anti-fraud measures. However, the report’s findings are a bit optimistic, given the recent disturbing signs that […]
Two New Op-eds by ACI
The following two op-eds were recently published in Florida newpapers and cover the state’s attempt to rein in automobile insurance fraud. Both op-eds were written by Steve Pociask, president of ACI. TCPalm on 4/26/2012 (click here to go to the page) The Ledger on 4/28/2012 (click here to go to the page)
